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Abstract. This paper is an invitation to carry out science and engineering for
a class of socio-technical systems where individuals – who may be human or
artificial entities – engage in purposeful collective interactions within a shared
web-mediated social space. We put forward a characterisation of these systems
and introduce some conceptual distinctions that may help to plot the work ahead.
In particular, we propose a tripartite view that highlights the interplay between
the institutional models that prescribe the behaviour of participants, the corre-
sponding implementation of these prescriptions and the actual performance of the
system. Building on this tripartite view we explore the problem of developing a
conceptual framework for modelling this type of systems and how that framework
can be supported by technological artefacts that implement the resulting models.
The last section of this position paper is a list of challenges that we believe are
worth facing. This work draws upon the contributions that the MAS community
has made to the understanding and realization of the concepts of coordination,
norms and institutions from an organisational perspective.
1 Introduction
“Social coordination” is a many-faceted phenomenon that has been the subject of at-
tention in a number of scientific communities: from economics to social anthropology,
from biology to computer science. The arrival of the internet and the massive adop-
tion of social networks and other web-enabled practices have lead the notion of social
coordination to acquire new meaning and, in reference to such on-line situations, an
unprecedented and substantial economic and social importance. Hence, we put forward
this position paper in order to start a debate about the research agenda (i) by mak-
ing a first attempt to identify the key features that characterize the space of artificial
socio-cognitive systems (ASCS) (ii) outlining an intentional architecture for ASCS,
and (iii) sketching some ideas, informed by some possible application domains, for a
software engineering approach to help realize ASCS, utilizing the many contributions
of the COIN community.
We are witnessing the birth of a new sort of tools that, anchored to human cognitive
capabilities, aim to support human-like social interactions in a virtual space where the
frontiers between the physical and the artificial are increasingly difficult to determine.
There is an opportunity to observe with a scientific eye how this process is taking place
and articulate an understanding that gives grounds to a serious assessment of its positive
and negative aspects and, perhaps, to its evolution. On the other hand, there is also a
technological opportunity to address the creation of those new tools in a principled way.
Needless to say that behind those opportunities there are ethical concerns that should
be taken into account.
This paper aims to be a step towards realising those two opportunities. Hence, its
focus is on social coordination within a particular kind of systems that enable individ-
uals – who may be human or artificial entities – to interact in a shared web-mediated
social space in a purposeful fashion. We shall call them artificial socio-cognitve tech-
nical systems (ASCS). Our goal is to provide foundations for an understanding of these
systems and in time establish a principled methodology for their construction. The im-
mediate outcome in this paper is the introduction of some conceptual distinctions for
that purpose. The ancillary objective of this paper is to point the way towards future
actions.
This is a position paper in which our key contributions are:
1. An intentional definition of ASCS (§2), with two essential distinct components:
socio-cognitive agents and the social space where these interact;
2. a “tripartite view” (§3) that attempts to explain the interplay among the three com-
plementary aspects of an ASCS: the institutional, the technological and the “real-
world”;
3. an identification of those features that are required to model a social space for ASCS
that has at least three properties or affordances (see §4): (i) awareness, by which
participants perceive their context (ii) coordination, by which collective action is
enabled and (iii) validity which establishes a set of correspondences between the
elements of our tripartite description of ASCS;
4. how the relationship between the model of an ASCS and its implementation is
mediated by a metamodel and a platform (§5), and, finally
5. a call to arms (§6)
2 A brief exploration of ASCS
Broadly speaking, our aim is to study systems that involve several rational participants
who come together to perform a collective activity that they cannot accomplish on their
own and such action does not occurr directly between individuals but is mediated by
technological artefacts.
This crude characterisation may be clarified by making explicit some underlying
assumptions:
Notion 1 An artificial socio-cognitive system (ASCS) is a multiagent system that sat-
isfies the following assumptions:
A.1 System An artificial socio-cognitive system is composed by two (“first class”) en-
tities: a social space and the agents who act within that space. The system exists in
the real world and there is a boundary that determines what is inside the system
and what is out.
A.2 Agents Agents are entities who are capable of acting within the social space. They
exhibit the following characteristics:
A.2.1 Socio-cognitive Agents are presumed to base their actions on some inter-
nal decision model. The decision-making behaviour of agents, in principle,
takes into account social aspects because the actions of agents may be af-
fected by the social space or other agents and may affect other agents and
the space itself [5].
A.2.2 Opaque Socio-cognitive AgentsThe system, in principle, has no access to
the decision-making models, or internal states of participating agents.
A.2.3 Mixed Agents may be human or software entities (we shall call them all
“agents” or “participants where it is not necessary to distinguish).
A.2.4 Heterogeneous Agents may have different decision models, different moti-
vations and respond to different principals.
A.2.5 Autonomous Agents are not necessarily competent or benevolent, hence
they may fail to act as expected or demanded of them.
A.3 Persistence The social space may change either as effect of the actions of the
participants, or as effect of events that are caused (or admitted) by the system.
A.4 Perceivable All interactions within the shared social space are mediated by tech-
nological artefacts—that is, as far as the system is concerned there are no direct
interactions between agents outside the system and only those actions that are me-
diated by a technological artefact that is part of the system may have effects in the
system—and although they might be described in terms of the five senses, they can
collectively be considered percepts.
A.5 Openness Agents may enter and leave the social space and a priori, it is not known
(by the system or other agents) which agents may be active at a given time, nor
whether new agents will join at some point or not.
A.6 Constrained In order to coordinate actions, the space includes (and governs) reg-
ulations, obligations, norms or conventions that agents are in principle supposed
to follow.
We may think of these systems as socio-technical systems because of the partici-
pation of humans and software components [20], although they are better understood
in the sense of [15] or even [19] where software agents may be involved. We use the
term artificial because we want to stress the fact that there is some external design of
the system and the term socio-cognitive to stress the fact the we glimpse some notion
of social intelligence. Because of the assumption of intrinsic constraint on action (A.6),
in standard multiagent systems terminology, the above assumptions characterise a type
of normative multiagent system [2].
Jones et al. [13] refer to this type of system as an intelligent socio-technical sys-
tem. While in this characterisation, the adjective “intelligent” denotes an assumption of
rationality, they also assert that these systems involve entities that “interact with each
other against a social, organisational or legal background” (as in A.2 above). Anal-
ogously, Castelfranchi calls them socio-cognitive technical systems to stress the fact
that in order to characterise or deploy them we need to “ ‘understand’ and reproduce
features of the human social mind like commitments, noms, mind reading, power, trust,
‘institutional effects’ and social macro-phenomena” [5]. In this spirit, we use the term
artificial socio-cognitive systems (or ASCS) to capture the essence of these last two
interpretations and omit the “technical” label to avoid redundancy.
Although it would be premature to propose a broad taxonomy of artificial socio-
cognitive systems, it is nevertheless possible to identify application domains where
these systems are or will be paradigmatic. For example, serious on-line games, mas-
sive multiplayer on-line role playing games, mixed-level participatory simulation of
social systems, open innovation environments as well as other crowd-based applica-
tions, on-line electronic markets, policy support systems, or on-line alternative dispute
resolution, to name a few.
The research programme for ASCS that we envision should eventually enable us
to design new such systems using a principled approach. We propose to address the
general problem, first by delimiting the universe to an explicit set of features that may
allow us to decide whether a given system – existing or in design –belongs to that
universe, and second, developing an abstract understanding of what is common to these
systems. These two steps would provide foundations for ACSC formalisms, tools and
methodologies.
3 A tripartite view of artificial socio-cognitive systems
Keeping the assumptions A.1–6 and examples in mind, one may advance an intuitive
description of ASCS as systems where it is possible to govern the interaction of agents
that are situated in a physical or artificial world by means of technological artefacts.
The key element in this description is in the “governance” part that mediates between
the world and the technological artefacts. It is an aspect worth distinguishing in ACSC
because of the need to control the activity of complex individuals that is at the root of
ASCS (A.2 and A.6). In order to elucidate how such governance is achieved we propose
the following tripartite view of ASCS:
View 1: The world system, W , as the agents (both human and software) see it and
relate to it.
View 2: An ideal institutional system, I, that stipulates the way the system should
behave.
View 3: The technological artefacts, T , that implement the ideal system and run the
applications that enable users to accomplish collective actions in the real world
according to the rules set out in I.
These three views are interrelated through three binary relationships (as depicted
in Fig. 1). The institutional world corresponds with the real world by what is known
as a “counts-as” relationship [18, 12] by which (brute) facts and (brute) actions in the
real world correspond to institutional facts and actions in the institutional world I only
when these comply with the institutional conventions, in which case the institutional
effects of those institutional actions carry over to have effects in the real world. Note
that W is not the entire real-world, only that part of the world that affects and may be
affected by the system. Secondly, the conventions prescribed in the institutional world
have their counterpart in the technological world in the sense that institutional conven-
tions constitute a specification of the requirements of the system that is implemented
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Fig. 1: The tripartite view of artificial socio-cognitive systems: The ideal system, I; the
technological artefacts that implement it, T , and the actual world where the system is
used, W . After [16].
in T . In turn, the system, as implemented in T is what enables interactions (through
a proper interface) in W , so the agents in W control the artefacts in T , but also, we
contend, this relationship is symmetric, in that by virtue of the percepts delivered via
T , the artefacts in T effect some control over the agents in W . It should be noted that
each of these three binary relationships needs to satisfy certain integrity conditions:
– The corresponds relationship needs: (i) to guarantee that the objects and concepts
involved in the descriptions and functioning in I are properly associated with en-
tities in W; i.e., that there is a bijection between terms in the languages in I and
objects and actions in W . (ii) that the identity of agents in W is properly reflected
in their counterparts in I and is preserved as long as the agents are active in the
system, (iii) that the agents that participate in W have the proper entitlements to be
subject to the conventions that regulate their interactions and in particular to fulfil
in W those commitments that they establish in I, and (iv) that the commitments
that are established according to I are properly reflected in W .
– The implements relationship needs to be a faithful programming of the institutional
conventions so that actions and effects are well programmed, norms are properly
represented and enforced, etc.
– Finally, the controls relationship needs to make sure that: (i) the technological arte-
facts work properly (communication is not scrambled, data bases are not corrupted,
etc.) and (ii) inputs and outputs are properly presented and captured in W , accord-
ing to the implementation of the corresponding processes in I. (iii) Algorithms and
data structures in T behave as the conventions in I prescribe.
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Fig. 2: Shared state in a socio-cognitive system
3.1 The shared state of an artificial socio-cognitive system
We emphasize that, in the preceding discussion, we are suggesting that the three views
correspond to the same ASCS. In other words, when we make reference to an ASCS,
we always refer to an entity that exists in the real world, works by means of some
technological artefacts and behaves according to some institutional conventions. We
also state that the three views are interrelated. However, we may go a step further and
establish the actual correspondence between the three views. For that purpose we rely
on the notion of shared state.
The intuition behind shared state is that at any point in time, what happens in the
world and enters the system produces some effects in the computational system that
become effective in the world. In other words, that the state of the world, as far as the
system is concerned, changes if and when an attempted action in W is validated by I,
and then the code in T processes the input that happens in W and outputs the effects in
W .
We may use the tripartite view of ASCS to get a clearer picture of how interactions
of agents within the system change the shared state. Fig. 2 illustrates how interactions
among individuals take place within a socio-cognitive system.
First let’s focus on W . Take two agents a1 and a2, in W , who are about to inter-
act within the system, each through its own interface device. Notice that, since these
individuals are real – human or software agents – and are present in the part of the
real world involved with the system, then the objects that exist, the facts that are true
and whatever changes take place in that part of the real world, are the same for both
agents, and for every other agent that is in the system at that point in time. Technically
speaking, the agents share the state ofW . Now let the first agent (a1) take an actionM1
in W . Provided that M1 is a feasible action, that action changes some facts in W , and
the state of the world changes from W0 to W1. Now, if a2 takes a new feasible action
M2 the world changes to a new shared state W2. Second, from a computational per-
spective, inputs M1 and M2 correspond to messages m¯1 and m¯2 that when processed
in T , produce changes in the data structures and values of variables in T , hence new
successive shared computational states, T1 and T2. Finally, a similar thing happens in
I when an institutional action µ1, (that corresponds to action M1 and is implemented
as message m¯1) takes the system from an institutional state I0 where certain formulas
are admitted, to a new shared institutional state I1 with new admitted formulas, if and
when µ1 is an institutionally admissible action, and likewise for a proper µ2. In other
words, we have now established a more abstract notion of an ASCS by introducing
three complementary components:
– A tripartite understanding of artificial socio-cognitive systems.
– The notion of state (of the world, computational, institutional), the use of valid
interactions as the sole way of changing that state and the existence of a set of
conventions that determine when an interaction is valid and, if so, how it changes
the state.
– Three mappings between the three views of the system: (i) mappings between ac-
tions, messages and formulas, (ii) mappings between states of the world, system
and institution and (iii) mappings between three notions of validity of interactions:
feasible, processable and admissible.
These constructs can be made precise, although such task is beyond the scope of this
paper, but even this crude description brings to light three crucial features that an ASCS
must provide in order to control sophisticated interactions. First, an agent needs to be
aware of the state of the world in order to decide what to do at some point. Moreover, in
order to attempt an action, that agent needs to coordinate with other agents with whom
it is interacting or would like to interact. Finally, the system needs to support a proper
notion of validity, so that the “isomorphisms” described above between the evolution
of the states of W , I and T are operational.
4 Designing the Social Space
In section 2, we characterised ASCS as collective processes involving several socio-
cognitive agents (human or not) who engage in web-enabled interactions within a shared
social space. We now want to move a step ahead and see how an ASCS can be designed
or modelled. For that purpose and based on the previous discussion, we need to account
for a way of dealing with the evolution of the shared state. Keeping in mind the distinc-
tions between system, participants and social space (textbfA.1) and the fact that agents
are opaque to the system (textbfA.2.2), we may limit our attention to the social space.
Moreover, because of the correspondences implicit in the tripartite view, we may limit
the discussion to the features of the social space in I and then extend that understand-
ing to T and W . In other words, if we want to design ASCS, what are the features we
need in the social space so one can determine what is a state of the system and what is
involved in performing a valid action. We propose to achieve this through what we call
“affordances” (in the spirit of Norman [17]) needed to model an ASCS.5
5 Recall Norman’s barrel. It is a water-tight cylinder with an intended affordance for holding
liquids but it also provides affordances of a table or a hiding place. Similarly, the features we
Notion 2 An affordance (of the social space of an ASCS) is a property of the social
space that supports effective interactions of agents within an ASCS.
At the end of the previous section, we postulated three affordances of every ACSC:
1. awareness, which provides participating entities access to those elements of the
shared state of the world that should enable them to decide what to do
2. coordination, so that the actions of individuals are conducive to the collective en-
deavour that brings them to participate in the ASCS and
3. validity that preserves the proper correspondences of the tripartite view.
There may be others, but we identify these because they contribute directly firstly,
to the establishment of individual perception of (common) social situations, secondly
to the realization of the mechanisms for collective action and thirdly to the correctness
of the activity as a whole.
It is evident that awareness and coordination—and other affordances as well— may
be achieved by a variety of means. Consequently, one could use a way to make explicit
the particular means through which these properties are achieved in a given ASCS; first
because there may be reasons to choose among different particular means and second
because participants—and technological artefacts—need to conform to the particular
means provided used for modelling the given ASCS. For this purpose we, first, take a
look at features that are involved in the achievement of the essential affordances. Next
we postulate the notion of a metamodel as a way of describing the particular means that
are used to generate those features.
A glance at some families of ASCS mentioned earlier (games, simulation, crowd-
based systems, electronic markets, ...) suggest concrete features that appear to be nec-
essary for the modelling of most ASCS:
1. Ontology. The point of this feature is to establish the objects that describe and
populate the social space. Some objects may be generic to a metamodel (norm,
scene, workspace,..) or to a family of ACSC (weapons in first person shooter games,
contract in prediction markets, etc.), others are specific to the application domain
of the particular ASCS (sword, bid,...).
2. Primitive actions and events. How percepts are represented. For example, offering
a picture for sale in an auction, bidding for it and declaring a bid invalid; reading
the room temperature.
3. Activities. The possibility of organising atomic actions into repetitive activities
through protocols, social semantics, a set of norms, etc. (to represent a bidding
round or mapping crisis events of a city).
4. Subspaces and their interrelationships. Constructs to describe (i) activities that
involve only part of the participants who share a sub-state of the system that is not
necessarily accessible to other participants, (ii) how these activities are interrelated
and (iii) whether or not agents may be active in more than one activity at a given
time (e.g., sequenctial scenes in a play, simultaneous auctions in eBay).
enumerate below have an intended affordance but others affordances may be achieved (for
free) depending on the way they are specified or implemented.
5. Social structure. Roles (author and reviewer) and relationships among roles (au-
thors cannot review their papers); groups (ad.hoc: task force; standard: jury; board
of directors) and organisational structures (team, department).
6. Social devices. Means for (i) tagging the behaviour of individuals, so that par-
ticipants may become aware of particular qualities (trust, social standing) or (ii)
processes for modifying it (ostracism, whitewashing, fines and incentives).
7. Regulatory system. Norms, normative consequence, enforcement mechanisms and
procedures, norm life-cycle management, etc. (see [16] for a thorough discussion
of normative affordances and features).
8. Dynamics of the system. How to measure the performance of the system and the
means to make the system change over time.
9. Types of agents. Means to choose the composition of the class of participants and
specially to include as part of the system design those agents (or their roles) whose
decision-making model is defined or is in control of the system itself. Two types are
most usual: external agents that are opaque to the system and internal who act on
behalf of the system who is responsible for their behaviour. For example, in games:
“players” (usually human) and “non-player characters” (software agents deployed
by the system designer).
10. Languages and information framework. Needed to express the specific instan-
tiation of features (for protocols, norms,...) and to store the design and enactment
data (local and global states of the system, agent profiles, performance indicators,
etc.).
These examples of features are meant to suggest how to make explicit the means
required for designing or modelling an ASCS. With the following descriptions we make
more precise what we understand by “the means for modelling” ‘ and “modelling” an
ASCS.6
Notion 3 A metamodel (for ASCS) is a collection of languages, data structures and
operations that when instantiated produce a model of an ASCS (and its internal agents,
if any), through features that achieve the affordances of awareness and coordination in
a social space.
Consequently, a model, in this sense, is simply a “good” description of a socio-
cognitive system:
Notion 4 A model of an artificial socio-cognitive system S is the instantiation of a
metamodel for ASCS, such that the correspondence between the view of S inW matches
the view of S in I.
Note that this “matching” entails that the integrity requirements of the three rela-
tionships are in fact correctly achieved. In particular (i) the counts-as relationship is
6 We adapt to ASCS the standard use of model as an abstract representation of a real entity
and metamodel as the abstract representation of models. See for example this use in UML:
“...[an abstract syntax that defines] modeling concepts, their attributes and their relationships,
as well as the rules for combining these concepts to construct partial or complete ... models.”
(superstructure version 2.2 (2009-02-03), p1).
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Fig. 3: Metamodel and Platform
correctly established by participants having the proper entitlements and an appropriate
bijection between terms in I and objects and potential actions in W , (ii) the model is
faithfully implemented in T and (iii) the input/output flow between T and W is not
corrupted. Note also that while we have kept the discussion in I, in the next section we
connect I with T by clarifying the relationship between the ideal model of an ASCS
and the actual implementation of that ASCS that is underneath the achievement of (ii).
5 Metamodels and Platforms
In our characterisation of metamodel (Notion 3) we did not commit to implementation
and formalisation although both are desirable properties. As far as implementation is
concerned, it would be rather convenient to have a cohesive collection of technological
artefacts (a platform) that includes a specification language to make a precise definition
of the model. Then, other artefacts of the platform would produce a run-time implemen-
tation of the model that controls inputs and outputs that preserve the validity conditions
of the shared context, as postulated in section 3. Thus, the “implement” relationship
depicted in Fig. 1 may be elucidated by the diagram in Fig. 3a.
Following a top-down reading of the diagram, one would start with an informal
understanding of the system (A) that will eventually be implemented (D). Ideally, on
would expect to have a formal model (B), which corresponds to the exact version of
the ASCS that one would like to have in I so that the effects of the actions on W
have the exact effect is W prescribed in I. However, the transition from an informal
representation of an ASCS to a formal model that is a proper formalisation of the actual
system is far from straightforward [13]. One way out is to rely on the metamodel to
connect (A) and (B) since, ideally, it provides the abstract constructs to describe (A)
in precise terms. The metamodel also provides a bridge between (B) and (D) when it
is linked to a platform that includes a specification language such that the metamodel
instantiations specified with it (for instance, C) generate faithful implementations of the
formal models (B).7
7 The point of these complexities are aptly made in Jones et al. [13] (Step 1, Step2. Phase 1,
and Step 3 in their method) where they argue for a rigorous analysis of the expressiveness of
A bottom-up reading of the diagram suggests a symmetric path where one starts
with an existing platform and intends to determine formal and computational properties
of the models that can be implemented with it (such would be the case of ASCS con-
structed using, for example the Amazon Turk or mash-ups of Facebook and Ushahidi).
There exist some metamodels for social coordination that were motivated mostly
by work on open multiagent systems. The following have been in development for a
number of years and all have a cohesive collection of technological artefacts that sup-
port them and have been used to desing or implement ASCS of reasonable complexity:
ANTE [4], EI/EIDE [8], InstAL [7], MOISE/JaCaMo [14] OCeaN [10], OperA/OperettA [1]
and THOMAS/ROMAS [11]. It is outside the scope of this paper to make a systematic
analysis of these but an illustrative comparison of ANTE, OCeaN and EI/EIDEDE is
available in [9].
6 A Call to Arms
6.1 Technical challenges
This paper looks at artificial socio-cognitive systems from a broad and superficial per-
spective, as an attempt to open a path into a new field. Although it is too early to draft
something as precise as a research programme, some immediate challenges are easily
discernable and we now sketch some strategic guidelines on how to proceed.
Validty as an affordance. When we introduced the notion of affordance (Notion 2), we
stated that validity is an essential affordance of the social space, in addition to awareness
and coordination; an assertion based on the preceding discussion of shared context. In
the discussion of the notion of model (Notion 4), we stated that a model is valid if it
preserves the “counts-as” relationship (and by transitivity of the tripartite diagram, its
implementation is supposed to uphold that validity in the real world). In other words we
wish to sustain the implicit claim that validity is a supervened affordance of the social
space. A claim that should first be made precise and then made operational. Informally,
the argument is as follows: from a top-down perspective, one would need to prove
that the normative components of the metamodel define models whose validity can
be demonstrated; and from a bottom-up perspective, the kernel of the proof is in the
bridge between the platform and the metamodel, since one may take the position that
an action in W is valid in T (is accepted as an input), and should be valid in I only if
the metamodel is a faithful formalisation of the platform.
Affordances and features. We also side-stepped – in Sec. 4 –two issues that are central
to the notion of metamodel:
1. The first is “ontological”. It is the problem of determining whether a list of features
is a good way to support the affordances of ASCS. On one hand, we have inciden-
tal indication that all the features we mentioned are present in one way or another
the formalisms and their operationalisation, in order to arrive to a proper specification (C). We
acknowledge that those same issues – as well as the computational considerations of their Step
2, Phase2 – are all present in the “top-down” design and the choice of the metamodel
in the families of examples we have mentioned along the paper, and some objec-
tive indication that most are needed to implement the type of ASCS that the seven
frameworks mentioned in section 5, in as much as most of these features are di-
rectly accessible (i.e . features may be expressed and implemented with their basic
constructs and artefacts), and may otherwise be paraphrased. However, a serious
effort on an extensional description of ASCS is needed to avoid the latent petitio of
this argument.
2. The second is methodological. Whichever way this “completeness” is achieved or
demonstrated, the problem of choosing a collection of features and a good form
of description and implementation for those features needs to be resolved for the
design of a metamodel (and its corresponding platform), and then the actual instan-
tiation has to be decided when modelling a particular ASCS.
Metamodel specialisation. The previous remark directs attention at a significant design
challenge: how specialised should a metamodel be? There is no obvious reason that we
can find that prevents the creation of a single metamodel for all ASCS but neither is
there an obvious reason that we can find to claim that developing such an archetype
would be advantageous.
Experience with the seven metamodels listed in section 5 confirm the procrustean
curse of formalisms and implementations: every time one models an ASCS with one of
those frameworks, the ASCS is “tortured” into the particular features afforded directly
by the framework. We presently lack a systematic comparison of frameworks that as-
sesses their advantages and limitations and provides sound guidelines for choosing one
or another, or to approach the question of whether a unifying framework would be that
ultimate metamodel.
On the other hand, the same reservations about the procrustean curse would suggest
the possibility of moving in the opposite direction. That is, develop metamodels (and
platforms) that are well-adapted to particular types of ASCS: a metamodel for games,
another one for participatory social simulations, another one for crowd-based ASCS,
and so on. The question then is, where should the specialisation stop? A metamodel for
games or a metamodel for first-person shooter games and one for MMORGs and one for
serious games? Again, we lack enough empirical analysis of families of ASCS and a ro-
bust understanding of affordances, features and metamodels to venture even a tentative
answer, but these are open questions that, we believe, may be fruitfully explored.
Metamodel/platform interplay. In section 5 we pointed out the whorfian ([21]) rela-
tionship between the conceptual framework that supports the formulation of a model
of an ASCS and the artefacts that are used to implement it (i.e., the expressiveness of
the conceptual metamodels and the facilities provided by platforms that serve to im-
plement particular ASCS). In some families of ASCS, there is a predominance of the
platform over the metamodel fostered by the wealth of cases for which an existing plat-
form is a good match (for example the Amazon Turk (https://www.mturk.com)
or MMORG engines, like RedDwarf server), or fostered by the versatility of the ba-
sic functionalities of a platform (e.g. Facebook used as the input for crowd-sourcing
the draft of the Moroccan Constitution. On the other hand the experience with cur-
rent metamodels is that the platform that supports them is not necessarily an integral
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Fig. 4: A “generic” metamodel for ACSC. Each feature contains several formalisms and
their supporting artefacts that are tailored to the peculiarities of a given ASCS
implementation. Although in many cases the actual features of the metamodels are im-
mediately expressible in the platform, many times they can be achieved only through
paraphrases.
The trade-off is not always clear and we believe that it is worth exploring ways
to find a balance of platform and metamodel expressiveness by examining the problem
from both sides. One possibility (mentioned above) may be to develop a more “generic”
metamodel that addresses all properties with a variety of formalisms that may be assem-
bled or instantiated in order to model specific ACSC. Figure 4 is a toy candidate for the
type of generic metamodel that involves all the properties we listed in section 4. Another
approach to the interplay of metamodel and platform is to construct a sound concep-
tual model for mashing-up available artefacts and platforms in order to provide proper
foundations to those components and, by extension, to the resulting mash-up.
Separation of concerns. We hold the assumption (A.1) that agents and social space are
different components of an ASCS. This separation is useful for a conceptual analysis of
ASCS, but it may also be valuable from a design point of view. An illustration of this
value is the advantages of designing non-player characters (NPC), or in general BDI
agents [3] within a norm-regulated environment. Likewise, the separation of design and
implementation – achieved by having a metamodel and platform – gives designers the
possibility of choosing the tools that implement their ideas, rather than choosing the
problems that are implementable by the tools. The degree and and tooling of those
types of separation deserve, we believe, a systematic analysis.
Reinventing the wheel. Because of the intrinsic interdisciplinarity of social coordina-
tion in ASCS, there is a natural propensity to approach the subject from a particular
perspective – ours being software development and regulated MAS – without paying
due attention to the questions, principles, theories and artefacts that have been and are
being developed in the theoretical fields of the inter-discipline. As Jones et. al. propose
in [13], a serious use of the pertinent developments of other converging disciplines is
not only useful but essential, if one intends to develop a principled approach to the
description and design of ASCS.
6.2 A wider view
The motivation behind this work is the realisation that the MAS community and the
COIN community in particular is well-positioned to address the challenges that ACSC
brings and harness the possibilities of developing a principled methodology for the
study and development of ASCS. The space for innovation is still to be plotted but it is
undoubtedly vast and some milestones are already visible.
Empirical study of ASCS This task should be approached for two kinds of reasons.
One is to provide an objective basis for theoretical and technological developments.
The other is to understand – from economic, sociological, political and anthropological
perspectives – how value is created through ACSC and how that value can be acquired
for the benefit of society. This task is, evidently, a rather obvious challenge for interdis-
ciplinary research.
Technological developments Little needs to be argued about the social significance of
platforms that are already available for developing ASCS and how some of their original
or intended applications have become massive social phenomena and considerable eco-
nomic successes. This is not likely to cease in the near future and consequently there
is a substantial opportunity for innovation in tools, methodologies and applications.
Specially if the emphasis on “principled” design is taken to heart.
Synergies A systematic study of ASCS will most likely require the convergence of sev-
eral disciplines. The topic of social coordination is currently being inspected (within the
Sintelnet project) from different standpoints: games, social simulation, analytical soci-
ology, cognitive and social psychology, formalisms for informal phenomena, crowd-
based applications, institutional theory and philosophy of law. These activities are al-
ready fostering collaborations with a strong synergistic component. This experience
points in the direction of new academic communities that are likely to spawn confer-
ences and periodic publications and eventually develop curricula and training.
An emerging scientific field. We share the view of Castelfranchi [6], that we are on the
threshold of a new society where ASCS will be a pervasive reality. It is one that we
do not fully understand and one of which we are becoming citizens through our use
of ASCS. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to claim that it may be worth developing a
scientific view of this reality and consequently develop the conceptual and theoretical
constructs to explain what is happening and to have a crisper view of what comes next.
Maybe, in a way not all that dissimilar to the zeitgeist of the early fifties that gave birth to
artificial intelligence – with its “mind as processor” model for individual rationality, we
are witnessing a new zeitgeist that may give birth to a new artificial social intelligence—
with “social coordination” as the core of socio-cognitive rationality.
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